Initiating action: The action-learning in PDIA

written by Matt Andrews

I recently wrote a blog in response to a question I was asked by a colleague about how we move from the foundation or framing workshop in PDIA processes—where problems are constructed and deconstructed—into action, and beyond that, action learning. In this post I will offer some ideas on how we do that.

First, we push teams to action quickly: We ensure that the teams working in the framing workshops can identify clear next steps to act upon in the days that follow the workshop. These next steps need to be clear and actionable, and teams needs to know that action is expected.

Second, we don’t aim for ‘perfect next steps’—just action to foster learning and engagement: The steps team identify to start with often seem small and mundane, but our experience indicates that small and mundane steps are the way in which big and surprising products emerge. This is especially the case when each ‘next step’ yields learning (with new information, and experiential lessons) and expands engagement (with new agents, ideas, and more). This is because the problems being addressed are either complicated or complex, and are addressed by expanding engagement and reach (which fosters coordination needed to confront complicated problems, and interaction vital to tame complexity) and leads to learning (which is crucial in the face of the uncertainty and unknowns that typify complex problems).

Third, we create time-bound ‘push periods’ for the next step action assignments:  After the framing workshop, the PDIA process involves a set of action iterations where teams go away and take the ‘next step’ actions they identify, agreeing to meet again at a set date and time to ‘check-in’ on progress. Each iteration is called a ‘push period’ in which team members push themselves and others to take-action and make progress they otherwise would not.

Fourth, we convene teams for ‘check-ins’ after their push periods, and ask questions: The team reassembles after the push period, with PDIA facilitators, at the ‘check-in’ date—and reflects on four questions: ‘What was done? What was learned? What is next? What are your concerns?’ Note that the questions start by probing basic facts of action (partly to emphasize accountability for action, and also to start the reflection period off with a simple report—a basic discussion to precede deeper reflection, which often needs some context). We then ask about ‘what was learned’, where we focus on procedural and substantive lessons (about all their experiences—whether frustrating or inspiring), and learning about the context.

Fifth, facilitating learning requires nudging and pushing: We find that you often need to push participants to ask deep questions about their lessons.

  • For instance, someone may say “we tried to get Mr X to work with us, and he did not respond positively, so we learned that he does not want to work with us.”
  • We would follow up by asking, “why do you think Mr X did not respond?”
  • Often this leads to a new set of questions or observations about contexts in which work is being done (including, very importantly, the politics of engagement). In the example, for instance, the ‘why’ question raised discussion about how people engage in the government (and if the team reached out to Mr X in the right manner) and the politics of the context (the interests of Mr X and how these might be playing into his non-response).

This process facilitates learning by the teams and by my PDIA facilitators. Both the teams and our facilitators produce written documents (short, but written) about what was learned. Over time, we can keep coming back to these lessons to ensure everyone gains a better understanding of procedural, substantive, and context issues.

As a note: People often ask where we address ‘politics’ in PDIA. That requires another blog post, but hopefully you see, in the description here, the basic process of what we call Political Economy Engagement (PEE), which we prefer to Political Economy Analysis (PEA). The action steps in PDIA always involve pushes into—or engagements with-the context and yield responses that allow one to learn about politics (who stands where, who has power, how it is exercised, etc.)

Finally, we push teams to the next steps quickly, again—which is where they ‘adapt’: You will notice that the last two questions we ask are about next steps and issues to address in taking these steps. We do not let teams get bogged down by tough lessons, but push them to think about what they can do next, adapting according to the lessons they have learned; we focus on what is important and what is possible ‘next’, given what has been learned; and we try to build and maintain momentum, given the belief that capability and results emerge after accumulated learning and engagement from multiple push periods.

In conclusion, When considered as one full iteration, the blend of programmed action with check-in questions and reflection is intended to foster action learning and promote adaptation and progress in solving the nominated problems.  The combination of learning while producing results (through solving problems) is key to building new capability.

 

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Some linkages to theory, literature and management practice

  1. Why we focus on learning and engagement in this process: In keeping with complexity theory, the principle idea is that action leading to novel learning and engagement and interaction fosters emergence, which is the key to finding and fitting solutions to complex problems. Further in keeping with theory, the idea here is that any action can foster learning, and it is thus more important to get a team to act in small ways quickly than to hold them away from action until they can identify a big enough (or important enough) next step.
  2. Why we refer to ‘push periods’: The Scrum version of agile project management processes have similar time-bound iterations, called Sprints, which are described as ‘time-boxed’ efforts. We refer to ‘push-periods’ instead of sprints, partly to reflect the real challenges of doing this in governments (where CID focuses its PDIA work). Team members are pushing themselves to go beyond themselves in these exercises, and the name recognizes such.
  3. How we draw on action learning research, and our past experiments: Our approach builds on PDIA experience in places like Mozambique, Albania and South Africa, which has attempted to operationalize action learning ideas of Reg Revans (1980) and recent studies by Marquardt et al. (2009). These combined efforts identify learning as the product of programmed learning (which everyone is probably familiar with, and is often provided through organized training), questioning, and reflection (L=P+Q+R), which the PDIA process attempts to foster in the structure of each iteration (with action to foster experience, a check-in with simple questions about such experience, and an opportunity for reflection—facilitated by an external ‘coach’ figure). The questions asked in the PDIA check-in are much more abbreviated than those suggested by Revans and others, largely because experience with this work in busy governments suggests that there are major limits to the time and patience of officials, and asking more questions can be counter-productive (and lead to non-participation in the reflection process). The questions posed to teams are thus used to open opportunities for additional questions: like ‘who needed to be engaged and was not?’ or ‘why did you not do what you said you would?’ or ‘what is the main obstacle facing your team now?’ As the team progresses through iterations, they start to ask these more specified questions themselves, and come into the check-in reflection session with such questions in their own minds.

If you are interested in reading the Sri Lanka working paper, you can find the full version here

Initiating PDIA: Start by running…and then run some more

written by Matt Andrews

“Once there is interest, how do you start a PDIA project?”

Many people have asked me this question. They are often in consulting firms or donor agencies thinking about working on PDIA with host governments, or in some central bureau in the government itself.

“We have an authorizer, know the itch that needs scratching (the problem), and have a team convened to address it,” they say. “But we don’t know what to do to get the work off the ground.”

I ask what they would think of doing, and they typically provide one of the following answers:

“We should do research on the problem (the itch)” or “We should hold a multi-day workshop where people get to analyze the problem and really used to a problem driven approach.”

I have tried starting PDIA with both strategies. Neither is effective in getting the process going.

  • When outsiders (donors, academics, or even central agencies responsible for making but not implementing policy) do the primary research on ‘the problem’, their product is usually a report that sits on shelves. If you start with such a product it is hard to reorient people to change their learned behavior and actually use the report.
  • When you hold an elaborate workshop, using design thinking, fancy analysis, or the like, it is very easy to get stuck in performance—or in a fun and exciting new activity. We find people in governments do attend such events and have fun in them, but often get lost in the discussion or analysis and stay stuck in that place.

Having tried these and other strategies to initiate PDIA interventions, we at Harvard BSC have learned (by doing, reflection, and trying again…) some basic principles about what does not work in getting started, and what does work. Here are a few of these findings:

  • It does not work when outsiders analyze the problem on behalf of those who will act to solve it. It works when those in the insider PDIA teams construct and deconstruct the problem (whether they do this ‘right’ or ‘wrong’). The insiders must own the process, and the outsiders must ‘give the work back’ to the rightful owners.
  • It does not work to stage long introductory workshops to launch PDIA processes, as participants either get frustrated with the time away from work or distracted by the workshop itself. Either way they get stuck and the workshop does not mobilize their action. It works if you convene teams for short ‘launchpad-type events’ where they engage rapidly and move as rapidly to action (beyond talk). We are always anxious to move internal PDIA teams to action. The meetings are simply staging events: they are not what ‘doing PDIA’ is actually about.

Acting on these principles, we now always start PDIA running.

We bring internal teams together, and in a day (or at most a day and a half) we ‘launch’ through a series of sessions that (i) introduce them to the PDIA method, (ii) have them construct and (iii) deconstruct their problems, (iv) identify entry points for action, and (v) specify three or more initial practical steps they can take to start addressing these entry points. At the end of the session they go away with their problem analysis and their next step action commitments, as well as a date when they will again meet a facilitator to discuss their action, and learn by reflection.

This is a lot to get done in a short period. This is intentional, as we are trying to model upfront the importance of acting quickly to create the basis of progress and learning. We use time limits on every activity to establish this kind of pressure, and push all team members to ‘do something’, then ‘stop and reflect’, and then do the next thing.

When we get to the end of each Launchpad event, the internal teams have their own ‘next step’ strategies, and a clear view that the PDIA process has now started: they are already running, and acting, and engaging in a new and difficult space. And they know what they need to do next, and what date in the near future they will account for their progress, be asked about their learning, and pushed to identify more ‘next steps’.

When I tell interested parties in donor agencies, consulting firms, etc. about our ‘start by running’ approach, they have a number of common responses:

“It does not sound like anyone is doing a proper diagnosis of the problem: what happens if the team gets it wrong?”

“What happens if the team identifies next steps that make no sense?”

“This strategy could be a disaster if you have the wrong people in the room—who don’t know what they are doing or who have a biased view on what they are doing…”

These concerns are real, but really don’t matter much in the PDIA process:

  • We don’t believe that initial problem diagnostics are commonly correct when one starts a program (no matter how smart the researchers doing the analysis).
  • We also don’t believe that you commonly identify the right ‘next steps’ from a study or a discussion.
  • And we also don’t believe that these kinds of processes are ever unbiased, or that you commonly get the right people in the room at the start of a process.

We don’t believe you address these concerns by doing great up front research. Rather, we aim to get the teams into action as quickly as possible, where the action creates opportunity for reflection, and reflection informs constant experiential learning—about the problem, past and next steps, and who should be involved in the process. This learning resides in the actors involved in the doing, and prompts their adaptation. Which leads to greater capability and constant improvement in how they see the problem, think of potential solutions, and engage others to make these solutions happen.

A final note:

When I discussed this strategy with a friend charged with ‘doing PDIA’ as part of a contract with a well-known bilateral donor, he lamented: “You are telling me the workshop is but a launching event for the real PDIA process of acting, reflecting, learning and adapting….but I was hired to do a workshop as if it was DOING PDIA. No one spoke of getting into action after the workshop.”

To this colleague—and the donors that hired him—I say simply, “PDIA is about getting people involved, and acting, and you always need to get to action fast. PDIA must start by running, and must keep teams running afterwards. Anything that happens one-off, or that promotes slow progress and limited repeated engagement is simply not PDIA.”

Learn more about initiating PDIA in practice in chapters 7 and 9 of our free book, Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action.

PDIA Notes 2: Learning to Learn

written by Peter Harrington

After over two years of working with the government of Albania, and as we embark on a new project to work with the government of Sri Lanka, we at the Building State Capability program (BSC) have been learning a lot about doing PDIA in practice.

Lessons have been big and small, practical and theoretical – an emerging body of observations and experience that is constantly informing our work. Amongst other things, we are finding that teams are proving an effective vehicle for tackling problems. We have found that a lot of structure and regular, tight loops of iteration are helping teams reflect and learn. We have found that it is vital to engage with several levels of the bureaucracy at the same time to ensure a stable authorising space for new things to happen. This all amounts to a sort of ‘thick engagement’, where little-and-often type interaction, woven in at many levels, bears more fruit than big set-piece interventions.

Each of these lessons are deserving of deeper exploration in their own right, and we will do so in subsequent posts. For now, I want to draw out some reflections about the real goal of our work, and our theory of change.

In the capacity-building arena, the latest wisdom holds that the best learning comes from doing. We think this is right. Capacity building models that rely purely on workshop or classroom settings and interactions are less effective in creating new know-how than interventions that work alongside officials on real projects, allowing them to learn by working on the job. Many organisations working in the development space now explicitly incorporate this into their methodology, and in so doing promise to ensure delivery of something important alongside the capacity building (think of external organizations that offer assistance in delivery, often by placing advisers into government departments, and promise to ensure a certain goal is achieved and the government capacity to deliver is also enhanced).

It sounds like a win-win (building capabilities while achieving delivery). The problem is that, in practice, when the implementers in the governments inevitably wobble, or get distracted, or pulled off the project by an unsupportive boss (or whatever happens to undermine the process, as has probably happened many times before), the external advisors end up intervening to get the thing done, because that’s what was promised, what the funder often cares more about, and what is measurable.

When that happens, the learning stops. And the idea of learning by doing stops, because the rescue work by external actors signalled that learning by doing—and failing, at least partially, in the process—was at best a secondary objective (and maybe not even a serious one). Think about anything you have ever learned in your life – whether at school or as an adult. If you knew someone was standing by to catch a dropped ball, or in practice was doing most of the legwork, would you have really learned anything? For the institutions where we work, although the deliverable may have been delivered, when the engagement expires, nothing will have changed in the way the institution works in the long run. This applies equally, by the way, to any institution or learning process, anywhere in the world.

The riddle here is this: what really makes things change and improve in an institution, such that delivery is enhanced and capability to deliver is strengthened? The answer is complex, but it boils down to people in the context doing things differently – being empowered to find out what different is and actually pursue it themselves.

In pursuing this answer, we regularly deploy the concept of ‘positive deviance’ in our work: successful behaviors or strategies enabling people to find better solutions to a problem than their peers, despite facing similar challenges and having no extra resources or knowledge than their peers. Such people are everywhere, sometimes succeeding, and depending on the conditions sometimes failing, to change the way things work – either through their own force of will, or by modelling something different. Methods to find and empower positive deviants within a community have existed for many years. But what if, by cultivating a habit of self-directed work and problem solving, it was possible to not just discover positive deviants but create new ones?

Doing things differently stems from thinking differently, and you only think differently when you learn – it’s more or less the definition of learning. Looked at this way, learning becomes the sine qua non of institutional change. It may not be sufficient on its own – structures, systems and processes still matter – but without a change in paradigm among a critical mass of deviants, those other things (which are the stuff of more traditional interventions) will always teeter on the brink of isomorphism.

We believe that positive deviance comes from learning, especially learning in a self-directed way, and learning about things that matter to the people doing them. If you can catalyse this kind of learning in individuals, you create a different kind of agency for change. If you can go beyond this and catalyse this kind of learnings in groups of individuals within an institution or set of institutions, and create a sufficiently strong holding space for their positive deviance to fertilise and affect others, then gradually whole systems can change. In fact, I’d be surprised if there’s any other way that it happens. As Margaret Mead put it, “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed, citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”

This is our theory of change. The methods we use – particularly the structured 6-month intensive learning and action workshop we call Launchpad – are trying above all to accelerate this learning by creating a safe space in which to experiment, teach ideas and methods that disrupt the status quo, and create new team dynamics and work habits among bureaucrats. By working with senior and political leaders at the same time, we are trying to foster different management habits, to help prevent positive deviance being stamped out. In doing all this, the goal is to cultivate individuals, teams, departments and ultimately institutions that have a habit of learning – which is what equips them to adapt and solve their own problems.

This does not mean that the model is necessarily better at achieving project delivery than other methods out there, although so far it has been effective at that too. The difference is that we are willing to let individuals or even teams fail to deliver, because it is critical for the learning, and without learning there is no change in the long term. Doing this is sometimes frustrating and costly, and certainly requires us gritting our teeth and not intervening, but what we see so often is agents and groups of agents working their way out of tricky situations with better ideas and performance than when they went in. They are more empowered and capable to provide the agency needed for their countries’ development. This is the goal, and it can be achieved.

 

 

Getting Best Fit in Development Projects is like buying a new suit

written by Matt Andrews

I often hear talk of moving from best practice to best fit in development. When I ask what people mean by this I seldom get the same answer. But the basic idea is that multiple solutions are considered  instead of a one-best-way solution. I like the idea in concept and have written on it as a way of ensuring that we get past the tyranny of one-best-way. But I don’t think having multiple solutions to choose from is enough.

Getting Best fit is not simply about looking at a variety of options and deciding which one works best in the place one is working. This is because it is really hard to know what led to and informed the ideas being considered, and it is hard to know what the contextual realities are in the place where one is doing the fitting. So: One may think that an idea from South Africa will work in Botswana, because there are contextual similarities, but one does not know if the South African idea depends on very localized political or capacity issues that are not present in Botswana.

The only way one truly does best fit is by trying stuff out and learning what works, hopefully why, and then adapting. Try the South African example in Botswana, ask where it is working and why, and then chisel the idea into a shape that fits Botswana better — simultaneously building some new capacities in Botswana to make the fit work.

It is not, therefore, about getting best fit in some conceptual manner, but about ‘fitting’ in practice. Kind of like being a tailor to someone looking for a new suit. How might it work? Let’s think of buying a new suit….

  • Identify the general type of suite that interests you…
  • Choose a variety of potential suites off-the-shelf
  • Try them on…with the tailor advising on their fit…
  • Learn what kinds of cuts and styles work best for your look (you may be surprised and find your assumptions were incorrect)
  • Decide on the style and cut and color you want (and other characteristics)
  • See what you can take off-the-shelf (you may have the entire suite, or a jacket, or a jacket with sleeves that need shortening, etc.)
  • Get the tailor to make alterations you need… as many as required
  • try it on again
  • make more alterations
  • pay that tailor and leave, to impress the world with your best fitted suit!

Why many development initiatives have achievement gaps…and what to do about this

written by Matt Andrews

Yesterday I blogged about Hirschman’s Hiding Hand. As I interpret it, a central part of his idea is that many development projects:

  • focus on solving complex problems, and
  • only once they have started does a ‘hiding hand’ lift to show how hard the problem is to solve,
  • but because policy-makers and reformers are already en route to solving the problem they don’t turn away from the challenges, and
  • so they start getting creative and finding ways to really solve the problem. Initial plans and designs are shelved in favor of experiments with new ideas, and after much muddling the problem is solved (albeit with unforeseen or hybrid end products).

I like the argument. But why do I see so many development projects that don’t look like this?

I see projects where solutions or projects are introduced and don’t have much impact, but then they are tried again and again–with processes that don’t allow one to recognize the unforeseen challenges, and rigid designs that don’t allow one to change or experiment or pivot around constraints and limits. Instead of adjusting when the going gets tough, many development projects carry on with the proposed solution and produce whatever limited form is possible.

I think this is because many reforms are not focused on solving problems; they are rather focused on gaining short-run legitimacy (money and support) which comes through simple promises of quick solutions. This is the most rank form of isomorphism one can imagine; where one mimics purely for show… so you get a ‘fake’ that lacks the functionality of the real thing…

Let me use Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms as an example.

What problems do these reforms try to solve? Quite a few, potentially. They could try to solve problems of governments overspending, or problems of governments not using money in the most efficient and effective manner (and ensuring services are delivered), or of governments using money in ways that erode trust between the state and citizens (and more).

Now, let me ask how many reforms actually examine whether they solve these problems? Very few, actually. Mostly, reforms ask about whether a government has introduced a new multi-year budget or an integrated financial management system. Or a new law on fiscal rules, or a new procurement system.

Sometimes the reforms will ask questions about whether fiscal discipline is improved (largely because this is something outsiders like the IMF focus on) but I seldom see any reforms–or any PFM assessments (like PEFA or even the assessments of transparency) asking if services are better delivered after reforms, or if reforms enhance trust between citizens and the state. I don’t even see efforts to systematically capture information about intermediate products that might lead to these ‘solved problems’. For instance:

  • Do we have evidence that goods are procured and delivered more efficiently (time and money-wise) after reform?
  • Do we have any systematic data to show that our new human resource management systems are helping ensure that civil servants are present and working well, and that our new payment systems pay them on time (and do a better job of limiting payments to ghost workers)?
  • Do we have any consistent evidence to show that suppliers are paid more promptly after reforms?
  • Is there any effort to see if IT systems are used as we assume they will be used, after reforms?
  • Does anyone look to see if infrastructure projects are more likely to start on time and reach completion after costly project management interventions?
  • Do we have records to show that infrastructure receives proper maintenance after reform?
  • Is there any effort to see if taxpayers trust government more with their money?

This is a long list of questions (but there are many more), and I am sure that some reforms do try to capture data on some of them (if you’ve measured these in a reform, please comment as such…it would be interesting and important to know). Most reforms I have observed don’t try to do it at all, however, which was the focus of a recent discussion on the role of PFM and service delivery Time to Care About Service Delivery? Specialists from around the world were asked whether PFM reforms improve service delivery and the answer was “we think so…we expect so…we hope so…BUT WE CAN’T TELL YOU BECAUSE WE DON’T ACTUALLY ASK EXPLICIT QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS.”

My concern with this is manifold: (i) Does the failure to ask if we are solving the problems suggest that we as a community of reformers don’t really care about the problems in the first place? (ii) Does it mean that we will not be sensitive to the situations Hirschman speaks about when he discusses unforeseen challenges that undermine our ability to address problems (simply because we don’t focus on the problems)?  (iii) Does this also mean that we will not have any moments where we explore alternatives and experiment with real solutions that help to overcome hurdles en route to solving problems?

Unfortunately, I think the observations of gaps after reforms speak to all of these interpretations. And this is why many reforms and interventions do not end up solving problems. In these cases, we get the half-baked versions of the pre-planned solution…with no adjustment and no ‘solved problem’. PFM systems look better but still don’t function–so payments remain late, wages are unpaid to some and overpaid to many, services are not delivered better, and trust actually declines. Most worrying: we have spent years doing the reforms, and now need to pretend they work..and have no learning about why the problems still fester.

The solution (maybe): In my mind this can be rectified–and we can move towards producing more projects like those Hirschman observed–by

  • focusing reforms on problems, explicitly, aggressively, from the start;
  • measuring progress by looking at indicators of ‘problem solved’ (like improved levels of trust after PFM reforms) and intermediate indicators we think will get us there (better payment of contracts, more efficient procurement, etc;
  • regularly monitoring this progress;
  • being on the lookout for expected unexpecteds (things that we didn’t know about that make our initial solutions less impactful); and
  • being willing to adjust what we started with to ensure we produce real solutions to real problems–functional improvements and not just changes in form.

For more, read This is PFM which advocates a functional approach to thinking about and doing PFM reform.

Hirschman’s Hiding Hand and Problem Driven Change

written by Matt Andrews

I referred to Albert Hirschman’s work on the “Principle of the Hiding Hand” in my class today. It is a great principle, and has real application when thinking about PDIA and problem driven change.

In his essay, “The Principle of the Hiding Hand” Hirschman argues that creative solutions most frequently come from adapting to tasks that turn out to be more challenging than we expect.

In Hirschman’s words, “men engage successfully in problem-solving [when] they take up problems which they think they can solve, find them more difficult than expected, but then, being stuck with them, attack willy-nilly the unsuspected difficulties – and sometimes even succeed.”

It’s really beautiful, because it takes as a given some facts that we often think stand in the way of doing flexible, PDIA-type development. Hirschman expects that decision makers will tackle problems, often adopt solutions that look attractive but are hard to pull off (perhaps like big best practice type initiatives), and will overestimate the potential results.

He argues that they wouldn’t try to do the challenging things that development demands if they didn’t think this way. So, he advises to ‘go with it’ …. but then wait for the unexpected… in the form of complexities, constraints, hidden difficulties, etc.

When these unforseen difficulties emerge, Hirschman argues, we have the opportunity to become creative–and to iterate and experiment and find and fit ways to solve the problems that initiated the work in the first place … building on the sunk costs already incurred in pursuing the big, best practice, perfect solution. (saying something like “we’ve come so far…let’s now iterate to ensure we actually solve the problem we set out to solve.”)

Beautiful: Start where you are, focus on solving problems, try the big best practice (but hard to actually do) solution, and become creative when you hit the challenges…

What he assumes is that you have space for flexible change and PDIA-type innovation because of the sunk costs associated with past (or current) reform. An interesting assumption, that I think we can look at academically and reflect on practically.

Required and fundamentally vital reading for anyone in development.

Doing Development Differently: Day 2 Summary

Yesterday was the last day of Doing Development Differently (#differentdev). A group of about 40 development professionals from around the world met to discuss positive cases where development initiatives (call them projects, interventions, activities or whatever) have led to real results and impact. It was another full day with two DDD Exchange Sessions, a PDIA example and another wind tunnel meeting. View the storify to see all the content, including videos, tweets, photos and blogs (Duncan Green, Alan Hudson).

We are delighted to share the rest of 7:30 presentations.

You can also watch Matt Andrews closing remarks below. Stay tuned for the upcoming Manifesto from the workshop!

Doing Development Differently: Day 1 Summary

Today was the first day of Doing Development Differently (#differentdev). It was a full day with two DDD Exchange Sessions, a design thinking session and a wind tunnel meeting. View the storify to see all the content, including videos, tweets and photos.

When we designed this workshop, we wanted to maximize the opportunity to hear from as many people as possible. Specifically, we wanted

  • to show that it is possible to do development differently;
  • the participants to discern key principles and cross-cutting modalities or tools;
  • to explore whether we could promote a vibrant Community of Practice for those trying to do development differently.

To facilitate this, we asked our presenters to prepare a 7:30 minute talk —with no powerpoints or visual accompaniments. The talk had to address the following questions:

  1. What problem were you trying to solve?
  2. How had you/your organization/others addressed this problem in the past?
  3. What did you do?
  4. How did you manage the politics of your work?
  5. How did you ensure learning in the process?

We are delighted to share the first set of 7:30 presentations: Michael Woolcock, Zack Brisson, Tim Williamson, and Kay Winning. Here are some key principles that cut across all the presenters:

  • Humility: We don’t know the answers
  • Articulate principles that can scale
  • Donors role: broker, convenor, facilitator, adviser
  • Understand context: listening, relationships and personal networks are central
  • Need feet on-the-ground to support the process
  • Create space for local solutions and local ownership
  • Embrace and navigate politics: work with what you have
  • Building and sustaining broad coalitions: middle/low level bureaucrats, many stakeholders at all levels
  • Iterative messy process: one that evolves over time, problems change, solutions change
  • Built-in rapid cycles of learning
  • Refine problem definition: focus on what really needs to be solved
  • Take advantage of windows of opportunity (shocks, critical junctures, etc)
  • Adaptability: thinking strategically but building on flexibility

Follow #differentdev and storify for live coverage of Day 2.

Doing Development Differently 2014

Last October, we hosted a one-day workshop entitled, Untying Development: Promoting Governance and Government with Impact. The day brought together different voices to discuss the challenge of creating a governance agenda that focuses on solving country-specific problems, involves local people through flexible and context-fitted processes, and emphasizes learning in the reform process.

We are proud to announce a two-day follow up workshop entitled, Doing Development Differently to be held on October 22-23, 2014 at the Harvard Kennedy School. This event is an opportunity to share practical lessons and insights, country experience, and to experiment first hand with selected methodologies and design thinking.The aim of the event is to start to build a shared community of practice, and to crystallize what we are learning about what doing development differently really looks like in practice. This event is co-hosted with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), with funding from the Governance Partnership Facility.

Follow #differentdev on Twitter for live coverage.

World Bank uses PDIA in Sierra Leone

written by Salimah Samji

International development experts often tell us that they cannot do PDIA because the project processes within their organizations do not allow for flexibility. The truth however, is that all development agencies have some sort of instrument that does allow for experimentation and flexibility. Here’s an example of how a Pay and Performance project in Sierra Leone explicitly used PDIA principles.

Civil service reforms are complex in and of themselves. If you add, a lack of capacity to implement programs, multiple reporting lines, demoralized civil servants, a lack of coordination amongst key agencies, and a low-level of trust, the potential for success of such a reform decreases significantly. Recognizing this, the World Bank team decided to use the key principles of the PDIA framework with support from the Leadership for Results (LforR) program for their Pay and Performance Project in Sierra Leone. The rationale for this was to bring a broad range of stakeholders together and facilitate a process of collective problem and solution identification, as well as to introduce experimentation and adaptability during implementation.

They began with some short-term results-focused Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs) in Year 0 and Year 1. The pilot was instrumental in building the confidence of the local civil servants by demonstrating that progress was possible in their context and gave them a sense of ownership. In addition, the short feedback loops facilitated rapid experiential learning about what results were actually achieved for both government and the World Bank staff – in PDIA terminology, we call this strategically crawling the design space.

Specifically, they used a two-pronged, learning-by-doing process, which included:

  1. Structured team coaching throughout the implementation process: A locally based rapid results coach who had an in-depth understanding of government and public sector reform was hired to provide support to teams on a daily basis. The coach:
    • Facilitated problem solving at multiple levels in the system with team-level work,
    • Helped create action plans by breaking a huge daunting task into smaller easier to digest chunks,
    • Motivated the teams despite the challenges, and
    • Created an opportunity for the teams to learn from each other and to see how their work fit within the larger picture.
  1. Facilitated leadership fora for dialogue: One-day strategic leadership convenings between leaders and implementation teams were held at critical points. These retreats served to review progress and learning, problem-solve, facilitate reflection, make strategic decisions, and course-correct where needed. In PDIA terminology, we call this maintaining the authorizing environment.

After 20 months of implementation (February 2014), they had several hard results. More importantly, there was stronger inter- and intra-agency collaboration and increased trust and communication. The teams actually had the capacity to do things themselves. The flexibility at the design stage allowed more politically and technically feasible solutions to emerge.

So, large bureaucracies can do PDIA and it doesn’t take forever. Bottom-line: the mundane matters and cannot be ignored for a project to succeed.

Roberto O. Panzardi and Kay Winning are in the process of publishing a paper with more details on this project. You can read about the preliminary results here.