Working with local governments to improve service delivery in Indonesia

Guest blog written by Karrie McLaughlin

Melayani project in Indonesia

When Indonesia decentralized just over 20 years ago, it did so partly on the promise that bringing services closer to citizens would help to improve them. However, at the same moment that responsibility for the provision of basic public services was shifting to local governments, the nature of those service delivery challenges was itself shifting from improving availability of services to improving access and quality. The logistical tasks of constructing clinic and school buildings and hiring nurses and teachers had largely been completed, and districts are now left looking toward the top of the tree at more difficult problems. This blog examines the MELAYANI – Untangling Problems in Improving Basic Services program to better understand the issues local governments face in dealing with more demanding service delivery challenges, and how they can better be supported in doing so.

Importantly, there is a common element to these more difficult problems—they are complex, context-specific and cannot be solved by one-size-fits-all prescriptions from the central government. The root causes of these problems are multi-faceted and frequently vary from one location to another. As such, they require district governments to play a more active role in identifying, understanding and responding to them.

MELAYANI addressed these challenges by working with local governments to solve service delivery problems of their choice, while testing scalable capacity development approaches and learning about locally-led change. Experiences in the three locations (Bojonegoro, East Java; Kubu Raya, West Kalimantan; and Belu, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT)) are presented in this video.

MELAYANI supported local governments to select the problems that they felt were most important, helping to ensure that they were locally salient. By anchoring analysis in a key issue, rather than a particular sector, it allowed both for more actors to be involved and for the identification and mobilization of new resources. In addition, by providing support to local governments to better understand citizen problems, it provided clearer arguments for policy stability and commitment.

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Can States Promote Game Changing Growth?

written by Matt Andrews

This post relates to the working paper, ‘Who Wins in the World Economy and English Football?’

The Question: ‘Can We Get Game Changing Growth?’

Governments are interested in addressing many problems. In our experience at Building State Capability (BSC), the number one problem always centers on the word ‘growth’. However, the problem is seldom as simple as ‘we are not growing’. Indeed, the vast majority of countries in the world have grown in the last generation, but policymakers we work with typically want more—especially in countries that one might call low or lower middle income.

These policymakers always ask us about the growth stories of the 60s and 70s in Singapore and South Korea, and about other East Asian Tigers. In so doing, we find them inquiring about how game changing growth happens in a country: growth that generates jobs young people actually want to do (to keep them at home), that is clean and sustainable, helps countries escape donor dependence, promotes national pride, allows sufficient income for citizens to enjoy real service access (showers in homes instead of from taps a mile away), fosters social cohesion, and more.

Most countries have not experienced this kind of game changing growth—even in the last generation’s historic global growth spurt. Rather, many countries have grown in absolute terms but stayed the same relatively—maintaining their position in a stubborn world order that does not seem to support significant change. Consider the chart below as evidence.

Screen Shot 2019-02-05 at 5.47.57 PM

Continue reading Can States Promote Game Changing Growth?

Bridging the Capacity Gap in Burundi

written by Salimah Samji

The knee jerk reaction to building capacity is to organize more training workshops. These are taught by experts and held in fancy locations, with free-flowing food and refreshments. The attendees often do not include the front line workers who are ultimately responsible for implementation. In some cases attendees do learn new skills and are inspired to try them out, but they return to the same old organizations and systems – they are the only ones who changed. Then there is the case of technical advisors/assistants being parachuted into ministries to help build capacity. The reality however is that the job of these advisors is to perform functions and deliver results leaving no time to transfer skills or to build capability.

In a recent paper entitled, “Escaping the capability trap: turning “small” development into “big” development,” authors Campos, Randrianarivelo and Winning discuss the process used to build capacity in Burundi from 2006-2012. The World Bank Institute in collaboration with the government decided to launch a program whereby small initiatives would be launched to demonstrate quick and meaningful results that would in turn be showcased and used to generate political buy-in at cabinet retreats, ultimately expanding the program and sustaining a process of capacity building. They used Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs) where small projects are created with measurable results in around 100 days. They began with a pilot of 2 RRIs in 2006 and had completed 246 RRIs by 2012. The authors consider Burundi’s experience as a “preliminary test” of the PDIA approach.

Initially the government was skeptical but agreed to conduct two small RRI pilots one in education and one in health. This process involved the entire chain of implementation actors and enabled these teams to learn what works and what does not. Team building and collaborative skills were necessary to ensure success.

  • Education: The problem was that it took one year to deliver textbooks to village schools. The goal of the RRI pilot was to reduce this delay in a province to within 100 days. They delivered 25,000 textbooks within 60 days.
  • Health: The problem was that there were few HIV/AIDS screenings of pregnant women in health care centers. The goal was to increase the number of screenings. They increased from an average of 71 per month to 482 in the first month, more than a six-fold increase.

The results of the pilots, as well as results from other African countries that had engaged in similar programs, were shared at a cabinet retreat. This helped create a shift in the mindset which allowed the methodology to be replicated in other ministries. In each retreat (4 in total) successful RRI experiences were shared, thus helping to build and sustain the authorizing environment. The results were impressive and include the suspension of payment to 728 ‘ghost’ individuals which saved the Ministry of Civil Service 60,000,000 Burundi Francs (US$ 470,000).

The authors quote the Ministry of Agriculture “leadership engagement from the top [the minister] right down to the base [even in decentralized provinces] encouraged a ‘spirit of results’ and mobilized people from all areas [the government administration as well as the local citizens] to work together to achieve what they wanted.” This is what Matt Andrews calls multi-agent leadership in his paper who really leads development?

Our recent untying development workshop had a session entitled new practice in action, which featured AGI’s work in Liberia, the Rapid Results Institute and the Innovations for Successful Societies at Princeton. You can watch the video here.

Bottom line: An RRI is one of many tools in the toolkit that espouses PDIA principles.

Happy Holidays!

PDIA in Cameroon

written by Salimah Samji

In a recent paper entitled, Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform: An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon, Gael Raballand and Anand Rajaram compare two World Bank projects in Cameroon: a $15 million, 5 year, Transparency and Accountability Capacity Development Project (TACD), and a $300,000, low-profile technical assistance project to improve performance in Cameroon customs.

The TACD story is all too familiar. It became effective one year later than expected, had only disbursed 10% after two years of implementation, and despite high level management attention and discussions with the country leadership, little changed. A mutual decision was taken to close the TACD one year prior to its close date citing poor coordination, lack of organization skills, systems in need of upgrading, and a lack of political commitment among the reasons.

The second is a ‘pockets’ of effectiveness story. The Director General of Customs requested assistance from the World Bank, to help improve performance management. The project was funded by a grant and was limited to knowledge transfer and technical assistance. In order to design the project, the team used the Bank’s in-house expertise coupled with that of a customs officer who had institutional knowledge of customs issues and understood the context as he had been an adviser to Cameroon. The pilot began with performance contracts in 2 offices for 6 months. It was focused on non-financial incentives. For good performance, congratulatory letters were placed in the files and publicly disseminated for wider recognition, and for bad behavior, team interviews, warnings, possible disciplinary action as well as removal from their position. In less than 2 months the clearance process was much faster, the attitude of the customs officers improved and revenues increased. An additional $16.5 million in revenue had been collected over the 6 months.

The second story is also a great example of PDIA principles in action.

  • Problem Driven: The problem was identified and nominated by the country. The focus was on solving problems as opposed to retro-fitting solutions. This also helps build ownership.
  • Crawl the Design Space: They carefully planned the pilot keeping the context in mind.
  • Try, Learn, Iterate, Adapt: The size and flexibility of the pilot allowed them to experiment. The tight feedback loops built-in to track the pilot allowed them to learn and adapt. They also built trust and credibility by imposing sanctions and rewarding performance.
  • Create/Maintain Authorizing Environment: The gradual buy-in of a key number of agents below the head of customs helped keep the pilot on track. This idea of multi-agent leadership is discussed in Matt Andrew’s recent paper Who Really Leads Development?

The authors conclude “the experience suggests that with institutional reforms, implementing a series of small well-designed changes may hold more hope for behavioral change than a large but ineffective reform that presumes the capacity for internal leadership of a complex reform.’ In reality, development projects involve people, who are the ultimate complex phenomena, embedded in organizations, which are complex, and organizations are embedded in rules systems (e.g. institutions, cultures, norms), which are themselves complex.